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Deadline: Beginning of next lecture


Algorithmic Game Theory

Fall 2019

Exercise Set 5

Exercise 1:

Consider the following fair cost-sharing game:



Each player *i* wants to be connected from s_i to t, and the edges are **undirected**. That is, two or more players can use the same edge *e* in different directions, and they all share equally the cost c_e of this edge.

Prove that the price of stability for pure Nash equilibria is at most 2 in this game. (In fact, you can consider any ring with n players.)

Exercise 2:

Consider the following mechanism (A, P) for the shortest path problem (see lecture notes for the setting):

- (a) Algorithm A computes the shortest path according to the reported costs $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_n)$.
- (b) Each selected player i (i.e., a player whose edge is in the selected path) receives a payment P_i equal to the cost of the alternative shortest path, that is, the length of the shortest path other than the path A(c) computed in the previous step.


Show that this mechanism is **not truthful** on general graphs.

Exercise 3:

(3 Points)

(2 Points)

Consider the following problem: There are n users (players) potentially interested in receiving a TV transmission, and the transmission is sent from a server **s** over this simple network:



(3 Points)

All users are located in the same node, and C > 0 is the **cost** for sending the transmission to one or more users:

The server s can select which users receive the transmission (and which do not). If one or more receive, s has cost exactly C in total (the use of the link). If no user receives, the cost for s is 0.

Each user has a **private valuation** v_i , that is, how much he/she is willing to pay for the transmission. Users can chet and report a different valuation r_i . The **utility** of user *i* is given by the difference between the valuation and the amount of money he/she has to pay:

$$-P_i + \begin{cases} v_i & \text{if } i \text{ receives the transmission} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Give a truthful mechanism satisfying the following two conditions:

- 1. Either only the user with highest (reported) valuation receives and none else does, or none receives the transmission.
- 2. If one user receives, then he/she is charged an amount which is at least the cost C.

Truthful means that reporting the true valuation v_i maximizes *i*'s utility (no matter how we fix the reports r_j of the other users).